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We All Need Somebody to Lean On:
Using the Law to Nurture Our Children,
Beginning with Third-Party Visitation
By John A. Pappalardo,*
with Cassidy Allison** & Samantha A. Mumola***
Abstract
Perhaps one of the single most important aspects of a
healthy childhood is emotional support from healthy caregivers.
As it stands, New York’s visitation law prohibits third-party
caregivers from stepping in and providing children with this
important psychological and emotional need by automatically
denying them standing to seek visitation in court. In New York,
third-party standing for visitation is denied solely on a
procedural basis, irrespective of the child’s personal familial
situation, namely whether their parents are completely
* John A. Pappalardo, Esq., is a partner at Farber, Pappalardo & Carbonari, a
law firm involved in matrimonial and commercial litigation, arbitration, and
mediation, with offices in White Plains, NY and Roseland, NJ. John also has
a private matrimonial mediation practice, is certified in matrimonial
collaborative law, sits as a matrimonial arbitrator, and is New York State
Certified as an attorney representing children in actions in which their rights
are implicated. He is one of approximately 650 attorneys who are certified to
the panel by the Appellate Division for The Attorneys for Children Program.
Mr. Pappalardo also serves as Guardian Ad Litem in matrimonial proceedings
and is admitted to the State and Federal Bar in New York, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts.
** Cassidy Allison, Esq. is currently employed as an Assistant Law Clerk for a
Supreme Court Justice. She received her Juris Doctor, cum laude, from the
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University in 2019, where she was a
Senior Associate on the PACE LAW REVIEW. She earned her Bachelor of Science
in Business Management and Administration, cum laude, from Mount Saint
Mary College in 2016.
*** Samantha A. Mumola is currently employed as an Associate Attorney at
Farber, Pappalardo & Carbonari, pending Bar admission. She received her
Juris Doctor, summa cum laude, from the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at
Pace University, where she served as the Editor-in-Chief of the PACE LAW
REVIEW from 2018 to 2019. She earned her Bachelor of Science in Criminal
Justice, summa cum laude, from Pace University in 2011.
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unavailable. Specifically, when a child’s parents become
unavailable due to death, incarceration or otherwise, and such
child becomes a ward of the foster care system, the child’s aunt,
uncle, or other third-party caregiver cannot petition for visitation
of that child under current New York law. As a result, the child
is effectively deprived of necessary emotional connections unless
the third-party caregiver decides to formally adopt him or her.
New York’s Domestic Relations Law does not explicitly prohibit
third-party visitation, but rather this current, nonsensical
application of New York visitation law has developed through the
judiciary, which is supposed to serve as these children’s last line
of defense. Thus, this piece respectfully calls for the court of this
progressive State to join other neighboring states in fostering
relationships between children and healthy caregivers by
awarding standing for visitation to third-parties when both of
the child’s parents are completely unavailable to take care of
them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
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II.
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IV. Where Current Visitation Law Is Failing Our
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V.
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B. Weighing the Pros and Cons ................................... 588
C. Learning from Our Neighbors ................................. 591
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I. An Introduction to Perpetual Disappointment and
Abandonment
You are eight years old. When you were two, your father
died in a tragic car accident as he was commuting home. Shortly
after, your only living grandparent, your paternal grandmother,
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passes away from heartbreak over her son. You can’t remember
the details of that year, but you do remember your mother
heavily relying on her sister to make it through this tough time.
Although only your aunt, she treated you and your siblings like
her own children. She did not have the means to take care of
you, your mother, and your siblings, as she had her own large
family and simply did not have the space or finances. However,
she did just about everything else for your family. In fact, the
extent of your childhood memories involves your aunt and her
husband, your uncle. When you were four, they taught you how
to swing a bat and brought you to the movies. When you were
five, they helped you with your reading homework and attended
all of your school concerts. When you made a mistake, they
spoke to you as if you were their equal. Any time you were sad,
they were understanding and went out of their way to comfort
you. They frequently provided for you and your siblings,
including buying everyone school supplies and clothes every
year. They sometimes even helped your mother with the grocery
bill. Your aunt and uncle hosted all of the holidays and had your
family over for dinner with your cousins every Sunday. You and
your siblings loved them like your own parents, and they loved
you back. You would never say it out loud because it would
break your mother’s heart, but you secretly wished they were
your parents instead.
By the time you were six, your mother became physically
abusive toward you and your siblings because she had never
really dealt with the pain of losing your biological father.
Having zero tolerance for this behavior, your aunt and uncle
wanted to take in you and your siblings, but your mother refused
to allow it. Angry and bitter, your mother rejected any attempt
they made to see you. Your aunt and uncle looked into filing for
visitation, but, before they were even given the opportunity to be
heard by a judge, they were immediately denied standing by the
court because they were not your biological parents. Shortly
after their inquiry, your mother was incarcerated for strangling
your sister, and, as a result, you and your siblings were taken
into the state’s custody.
Foster care was a foreign term to you; you had no idea what
it meant, but you quickly found out; your life changed in the
blink of an eye. Before arriving at your new group home, you

3
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were forced to separate from your siblings because there weren’t
enough available beds in one facility. Being surrounded by
strangers was a scary feeling for you. It was December, but the
festive joy quickly disappeared from your life because you
realized you will be spending the holidays without your family.
You are confused because you know you haven’t done anything
wrong to deserve this, but yet you feel like you are being
punished as if you have committed a crime.
A few months pass before you are told by a staff member
that your mother has died from a drug overdose. This hits you
hard and you suddenly start to feel entirely alone. The slight
glimmer of hope that your mother would return for you has now
completely extinguished. No one in the group home has the
ability to make your extreme sadness go away because they can’t
relate to your circumstances. The only people who know what
you’re going through are your siblings and your aunt and uncle.
You wish you were home right now. Where is your aunt and
uncle? You thought they would have at least come to see you;
you thought they cared. Little do you know that, as your only
living family members, they tried to petition for visitation a
second time when you were in foster care, but the court yet again
refused to even hear their case based on the fact that they were
not your biological or adoptive parents or grandparents. They
weren’t even allowed to visit you in foster care.
This fictional anecdote is loosely based on the facts in the
New York Appellate Division case, In re Katrina E.1 It is an
illustration of the harsh emotional and psychological effects that
current visitation laws potentially have on children raised by
non-traditional families. One can only imagine what it is like to
be an eight-year-old child forced to live in foster care because
their parent(s) physically abused them; traumatic, confusing,
and lonely are a few words that might come to mind. At eight
years old, a child should only be exposed to trivial decisions such
as whether they prefer sports over music, acting over singing, or
playing outside over gaming. Their only worries should consist
of whether their team is going to win the championship game, if
their friends will be able to hang out with them this weekend, or
if they will be able to perform well at their dance recital.
1.

636 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1996).
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Children shouldn’t have to think twice about relying on adults
so they can be left free to live their lives as kids; they should be
able to assume that their needs are going to be highly prioritized
and taken care of by adults. However, it cannot be said that New
York’s judicial and legislative systems are facilitating this goal
when the implementation of current visitation laws fail to
endorse and promote relationships between children and thirdparty caregivers that are crucial to the development of the child
and the betterment of our society.
The purpose of this note is to highlight the importance of a
child’s relationship with non-biological parental figures and
urge members of New York’s judicial and legislative systems to
better protect the needs of children. More specifically, the goal
is to bring attention to the nonsensical, tragic upshot of the
automatic denial of third-party visitation. Part II of this note
will explore the emotional and developmental needs of children
in further detail. Parts III and IV will review New York’s prior
legal changes in the area of visitation law by analyzing past and
current law, respectively, as well as illustrate the disconnect
between childrens’ emotional needs and the execution of current
visitation laws. Finally, the judiciary’s historical role in
effectuating necessary change in the law will be examined in
Part IV, as well as an argument that the current disconnect is
the judiciary’s obligation and responsibility to remediate.
II. The Instinctual and Universal Need for Emotional
Connections
It is a psychological certainty that all children instinctively
share particular emotional needs which must be satisfied in
order to foster their healthy development.2 An emotionally
stable child requires continuity, love, care, support, guidance,
and understanding–attributes that are primarily achieved
through communication with healthy adults.3 “Communication
2. See generally EILEEN JOHNSON, THE CHILDREN'S BILL OF EMOTIONAL
RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN (2011) (explaining children’s
innate emotional needs and what occurs when these needs are not met).
3. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 5 (stating “children are vulnerable
beings who are dependent on other beings—adults”); Katherine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
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. . . is one of the most vital aspects of human life[;] . . .
[d]evelopment of one’s ideas and thought processes [is]
contingent on being listened to and validated by respected
caregivers.”4 Studies have shown there is a significant benefit
that comes from continued contact with third parties functioning
as parents, and, contrariwise, if this bond is terminated,
children are likely to suffer “emotional distress and possible
substantial psychological harm.”5 Thus, it is a proven theory
that children who are able to form meaningful connections with
those who love and care for them are more likely to become highfunctioning members of society.6
Conversely, it is close to inevitable that children who are
forced to grow up without healthy parents develop emotional
issues, whether they surface now or later in life.7 When children
and adolescents are not fortunate enough to maintain emotional
connections with healthy adults, they commonly react to such
lack of emotional satisfaction by acting out, entering into a
depression, developing and experiencing anxiety, and/or
emotionally withdrawing from their present circumstances.8
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 90211 (1984) (highlighting and substantiating the significance of
continuity in a child’s life, even at the risk of some uncertainty or instability);
Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Non-Parents after Troxel v. Granville: Where
Should States Draw the Line?, 32 Rutgers L.J. 783, 791 (2001) (“Child
development experts point to the importance of ensuring continuity of a child's
relationships with caregiving adults.”).
4. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 12.
5. Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best:
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference after Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 865, 892 (2003).
6. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21; Bartlett, supra note 3, at
90211 (explaining that separation from caregivers is detrimental to children).
7. Andrea Brandt, 4 Ways That Childhood Trauma Impacts Adults,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jun. 1, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
mindful-anger/201706/4-ways-childhood-trauma-impacts-adults
(stating
“[w]hether you witnessed or experienced violence as a child or your caretakers
emotionally or physically neglected you, when you grow up in a traumatizing
environment you are likely to still show signs of that trauma as an adult”).
8. See MARION BOWER & JUDITH TROWELL, THE EMOTIONAL NEEDS OF
YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: USING PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS IN THE
COMMUNITY 13 (Marion Bower & Judith Trowell eds., 1996) (listing various
coping mechanisms that humans instinctively use to deal with emotional
conflicts including repression, which leads to being “cut off and out of touch”
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It is important to note that these responses are not
necessarily intentional, but rather instinctive defense
mechanisms to protect their well-being.9 When left uncorrected,
emotional instability and trauma is likely to have a “lifelong and
often irrevocable impact in shaping the nature of the adult.” 10
This is because a child’s brain is different from an adult’s in that
it is more susceptible to influence,11 making emotional damage
more difficult to overcome.12 Issues that are suppressed by
children will pave the way for criminal or self-destructive
behavior,13 as the same repressed emotional traumas will
without doubt resurface at a later time in life.14

and displacement, which leads to aggressively (and seemingly irrationally)
acting out one’s anger onto others); JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 21 (cautioning
that not only is a child is subject to developing anxiety, hyper-vigilance, or
depression when their first cries are ignored by parents, but also a “[l]ack of
emotional responsiveness . . . can result in shyness, insecurity, anger, and antisocial or self-destructive behavior”).
9. Megan Glynn Crane, Childhood Trauma's Lurking Presence in the
Juvenile Interrogation Room and the Need for A Trauma-Informed
Voluntariness Test for Juvenile Confessions, 62 S.D. L. REV. 626, 643 (2017)
(“where a child endures repeated or chronic stress, the body suppresses the
stress response in order to normalize cortisol levels”); Jerry von Talge,
Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family
Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 111, 137 (2000) (stating that children repress feelings as an
unconscious defense mechanism when negative emotional feelings become too
painful to handle).
10. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at viii.
11. Patrick Harty, Book Note, The Moral and Economic Advantages of
Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility in New York Among Juvenile
Offenders, and Plans for Rehabilitation, 33 TOURO L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2017)
(stating “research has shown that adolescents . . . are . . . more susceptible to
outside influences”).
12. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 5, 6.
13. Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 337 (2002) (stating “[t]he emotional
unconscious also appears to be the basis for self-destructive habits that can
possibly lead to criminal behavior”); Mark Tran, Diagnosed Depression Linked
to Violent Crime, Says Oxford University Study, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2015, 5:31
AM) (stating that, according to psychiatric experts, “[p]eople diagnosed with
depression are roughly three times more likely than the general population to
commit violent crimes”).
14. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 7.
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Although it is ideal for biological parents to be the
caregivers that fulfill their children’s emotional needs, this is
frequently not the case. In fact, it is becoming more common for
children to form close connections with extended family
members and biological strangers than ever before.15 In many
cases where there is an absence of adequate parental care, other
non-parental third parties, such as aunts, uncles, grandparents,
neighbors, family friends, stepparents, and foster parents, step
in and establish supportive and emotionally beneficial
connections to children who would otherwise have no one to love
and care for them. Although not considered traditional,
relationships between non-parental caregivers and children can
be considerably beneficial to children.16 “As the child grows, his
emotional life depends on the strength of [the caregiver-child]
connection;”17 maintaining such relationship is in the best
interest of the child. Thus, the relationship between a caregiver
and a child should be highly valued by our court system
notwithstanding the parties’ biological affiliation.
III. A Brief History of Visitation Rights in America
Historically speaking, visitation disputes regarding minor
children have been brought by many different people such as
grandparents, de facto parents, stepparents, and even third
parties in general. As far back as 1966, we can see the
conflicting opinions throughout the courts as to visitation and
how it applies to Grandparents and third-parties. Specifically,
grandparents’ visitation rights have drastically changed over
the past years, showing an increase in the opinion that visitation
does not necessarily take away from parent custodial rights.
When comparing pre-1990s to the present, we went from a time
15. See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Redefining the Family:
Undermining the Family, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 385 (2004) (stating that
“we are in a transitional stage along the continuum from sanctioning only
biologically based families to legally recognizing functional families”) (quoting
James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001
B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 936 (2001)).
16. Maldonado, supra note 5, at 870.
17. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21.
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where most courts had differing opinions on grandparent
visitation, to now, when every state has some type of law
allowing grandparents to have visitation rights.18
Grandparents have had standing to petition for visitation
in some courts as far back as 1966.19 Courts have stated that
they “[do] not believe that visitation rights to a grandparent
would in effect diminish the custody of the respondent,” and that
the visitation should be granted when in the best interest of the
child.20 Although some courts have determined that visitation
for grandparents was acceptable, state supreme courts
continued to have mixed rulings until the 1990s.21 Some
examples over the years are: (1) in 1992, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that the parental rights were not violated by
grandparent visitation,22 (2) in 1993, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that if you were granting grandparent visitation in
the best interest of the child, then it was not a constitutional
violation,23 (3) in 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
when a child is residing with both parents, and one of the
parents was against the visitation, then the visitation statute as
it relates to grandparents violated the parent’s constitutional
right to the upbringing of their child,24 and (4) in 1998, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the grandparent visitation
statute was unconstitutionally applied and, therefore, violated
the Parents’ right to the management of their minor Child
because the statute allowed the disruption of an intact nuclear
family against the wishes of both parents.25 These differing
opinions across the states as it applies to grandparent visitation
is an illustration of how, over time, courts are slowly adapting to
new social norms in the context of families and the upbringing
of their children.

18. Maldonado, supra note 5, at 892.
19. See generally, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Fam. Ct.
1966).
20. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Fam. Ct. 1966).
21. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 90211 (explaining that separation from
caregivers is detrimental to children).
22. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky. 1992).
23. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).
24. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 S.O.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996).
25. Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
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When looking back on the 1991 well-known case, Alison D.
v. Virginia M., one can see that the Court decided on the issue
of visitation as it applies to same-sex couples, which, if decided
in this manner today, would be shocking.26 In this case, two
women were in a romantic relationship and decided to have a
child by means of artificial insemination.27 Together, the couple
agreed on the terms of conception, birth, and all other child
rearing decisions.28
Further, they agreed to share joint
responsibilities in raising this child.29 However, when the child
was four years old, the parents decided to end their
relationship.30 The visitation between the child and the
Petitioner continued for a few years, but once the relationship
between both mothers diminished, the Respondent cut all ties
with the Petitioner and did not allow contact with the child. 31
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court’s decision holding
that the Petitioner was a biological stranger to the child and did
not meet the requirements of a “parent” under New York’s
Domestic Relations Law. 32 Therefore, she could not petition for
visitation with the child.33
Third-party visitation has also been highly debated in the
past, even in cases where the third party is one who assumes the
parental role in a child’s life.34 In 1987, Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG.
was brought by a petitioner who raised a child for the first year
of the child’s life, signed the child’s birth certificate, and held
himself out as the father to this child.35 The Court held that, not
only could the Petitioner not have visitation, but also that he did
not have the standing to even petition for it because he was not
a biological parent to the child.36

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
Id.
Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 77.
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IV. Where Current Visitation Law Is Failing Our Children
Currently, third party visitation is still not acknowledged
in the State of New York, even though many states across the
United States are creating statutes that would allow this to
occur.37 New York has two statutes that apply to standing in
regards to petitioning for visitation.38 Section 71 of the Domestic
Relations Law allows for siblings to have standing for
visitation.39 The statute provides:
Where circumstances show that conditions exist
which equity would see fit to intervene, a brother
or sister or, if he or she be a minor, a proper person
on his or her behalf of a child, whether by half or
whole blood, may apply to the supreme court by
commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of
habeas corpus to have such child brought before
such court, or may apply to the family court
pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred
fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return
thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the
parent or any other person or party having the
care, custody, and control of such child, to be given
in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may
make such directions as the best interest of the
child is he may require, for visitation rights for
such brother or sister in respect to such child.40
Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law allows standing
to grandparents for visitation.41 The statute provides:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor
child, residing within this state, is or are
deceased, or where circumstances show that

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See generally Romasz v. Coombs, 55 N.Y.S.3d 770 (App. Div. 2017).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 71, 72 (McKinney 2010).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2010).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2010).
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conditions exist which equity would see fit to
intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of
such child may apply to the supreme court by
commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of
habeas corpus to have such child brought before
such court, or may apply to the family court
pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred
fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return
thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the
parent or any other person or party having the
care, custody, and control of such child, to be given
in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may
make such directions as the best interest of the
child may require, for visitation rights for such
grandparent or grandparents in respect to such
child.42
Neither statute “expressly . . . exclude[s] other classes of
individuals.”43 One could certainly argue that to do so would
create a biological hierarchy where there is a divine presumption
that a grandparent or sibling has been more influential in a
child’s life than an aunt, uncle, or family friend. With that said,
ever since the Supreme Court of the United States decided in
Troxel v. Granville, states have been unsure how to apply thirdparty visitation statutes.44 In Troxel v. Granville, paternal
grandparents sought visitation of their grandson after his
father, their son, had passed away.45 At the time, Washington
had a visitation statute that said any person, at any time, can
petition the Court for visitation.46 The trial court granted
visitation to the grandparents, but the Supreme Court of
Washington reversed, stating that the statute infringed on the

42. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2010).
43. John A. Pappalardo, New York State’s Refusal to Promote Visitation
Between Foster Care Children and their Extended Family, 23 WESTCHESTER B.
J. 189, 191 (LEXIS 1996).
44. See generally Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after
Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279 (2000).
45. 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000).
46. Id.
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parents fundamental right to the upbringing of their child. 47
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States,
it rendered an opinion specifically on the Washington statute,
stating that it was “breathtakingly broad” and did not give any
special weight to parents.48 Ever since this opinion was written,
states have been unsure how to construct and implement thirdparty visitation statutes.49
One case in which a court has gotten it right is Brooke S.B.
v. Elizabeth A.C.C.50 This is a case where the Court had the
gumption to overturn Alison D.51 In In re Brooke, two women
were engaged to be married and jointly decided they wanted to
have a child.52 Together, they decided that the Respondent
would be artificially inseminated with the Child.53 Petitioner
was consistently engaged in the Respondent’s pregnancy, as she
helped to take care of Respondent, attended routine doctors’
appointments and an emergency room visit when Respondent
experienced some complications.54 After Respondent gave birth
to their son, the couple raised him together for approximately a
year. The Child even referred to the petitioner as “Mama B.” 55
One year after the Child was born, the parties decided to end
their relationship.
At first, the Respondent allowed the
Petitioner to have visitation with their son, and the petitioner
remained involved in his life.56 However, after some time, the
Respondent cut all contact with Petitioner and isolated her from
the Child.57 As a result, Petitioner proceeded to file for visitation
and custody of their son, even though the precedent in Alison D.,
discussed supra, held that she did not have standing to do so. 58
The Family Court expressed that this case was “heartbreaking”
but that the petitioner did not adopt the child and therefore was
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See generally id.
Id. at 67.
Buss, supra note 44.
61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 49091.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id.
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 491 (N.Y. 2016).
Id.
Id.
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not a parent as the statute intended.59 The attorney for the child
appealed the case and the Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed the decision, stating that there was no biological
relationship nor an adoption and therefore had no standing to
seek custody or visitation.60 Instead of disallowing visitation
rights to third parties, it decided that when a partner can show
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to
conceive and raise the child together, then the partner has
standing to seek visitation as a parent.61 When comparing
where we were to where we are, yes we have improved in this
area, however, we still have a long way to go.
A puzzling aspect of current visitation law in New York is
that the State does not allow third parties to have standing to
petition for visitation, but courts are still actively awarding
visitation to third parties during custody proceedings.62 Strobel
v. Danielson is a case where the father of the child murdered the
mother of the child.63 The father was sent to prison and would
remain there for the rest of his life,64 leaving the child with no
parents or custodian.65 Both the grandmother and the aunt of
the child petitioned the Court for full custody66 under Domestic
Relations Law 240, which states that anyone with an important
role in the child’s life may petition for custody in extraordinary
circumstances, which were met in this case.67 Prior to the
hearing, the Family Court “awarded the grandmother sole
custody of the child, with scheduled visitation to the aunt.”68
This is a situation where the aunt did not have standing to
petition for visitation, but was granted it once she petitioned for
custody and lost in her attempt to gain it over the
grandmother.69 It is unexplainable why New York courts think
that it is sensible to order visitation to third parties during
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 501.
See generally Strobel v. Danielson, 74 N.Y.S.3d 387 (App. Div. 2018).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 389.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2015).
Strobel, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 389.
See generally id.
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custody proceedings, but will not allow these same third parties
to petition for visitation without having a custody petition
filed.70
Another instance in which New York courts will grant
visitation to third parties is under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Equitable estoppel is a doctrine imposed by the law as
a matter of fairness.71 Its purpose is to “preclude a person from
asserting a right after having led another to form the reasonable
belief that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice
to the other would result if the right were asserted.”72 Under
this doctrine, the Court generally requires a showing of an
agreement between the parties, usually predating the birth of
the child in question, which displays the intent to raise the child
as a cohesive family.73 The Court imposes the doctrine “to
prevent the enforcement of rights which would work a fraud or
injustice upon the person against whom enforcement is sought
and who, in justifiable reliance upon the opposing party’s words
or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief that such
enforcement would not be sought.”74 In matters where a prior
agreement can be substantiated, the court will give great
deference to the parties’ agreement. For example, if three people
agree to conceive and raise a child together as one family unit,
courts will uphold the agreement under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.75 The application of this doctrine can be beneficial to
the child because it maintains the third-party parental
relationship; however, equitable estoppel is a difficult standard
to overcome because there must be a prior agreement between
the parties. Without this agreement, third parties would be left
without standing; there is no way that a third-party parent can
turn back time and create this agreement. Therefore, there are
an infinite number of cases where equitable estoppel does not
apply.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 894 (App. Div. 2018).
Id.
Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (App. Div. 2002).
Id.
See, e.g., David S. v. Samantha G., 74 N.Y.S.3d 730 (2018).
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V. The Judiciary’s Responsibility to Fix the Callous Disconnect
As one can see, despite a magnitude of research regarding
the needs of children, there is an extreme disconnect between
what is best for child development and visitation law as it stands
today. It is important to mention the dissenting opinion in
Alison D., where, at the time, soon-to-be Chief Judge Judith
Kaye stated “the impact of today’s decision falls hardest on the
children of those relationships, limiting their opportunity to
maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development.”76
As discussed, supra, third parties, no matter how interested
or involved they are in the child’s life, (to the extent they are not
a grandparent or sibling) are automatically denied standing to
seek visitation merely because of the nature or type of their
biological ties to the child. The only time a court awards a nonbiological parent visitation is as a lesser award when petitioning
for custody or under the incredibly difficult doctrine of equitable
estoppel. This means that, under current law, even when a
biological parent is completely unavailable to the child, whether
it be by death, neglect, or a prior termination of parental rights,
courts will still refuse to so much as consider a visitation petition
from anyone who is not a parent, grandparent, or sibling unless
there was prior written consent by the biological parent to the
formation of the third-party parental relationship with the child
under the incredibly difficult doctrine of equitable estoppel.77
Although it is well established that there should be great
weight given to the rights of biological and adoptive parents
when ruling on third-party visitation,78 the concept that a child,
with unavailable parents and grandparents, is automatically
precluded from maintaining a healthy relationship with a nonparental caregiver is an illogical and nonsensical application of
the law proven to be severely injurious to society.79 As a result,
76. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991).
77. For example, when a couple agrees to conceive with the help of a
surrogate. See 3 NY FAM. CT. LAW & PRAC. § 16:54.
78. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
79. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 21; Bartlett, supra note 3, at
90211 (stating that “[a]n absence of permanence in a [child’s life] may cause
him [or her] to have difficulty learning self-control and absorbing a value
system”).
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loving and caring relationships with non-parental adults are
eliminated from a child’s life even if they do not have anyone else
to turn to. In its application of the law, courts are essentially
making a statement that they would rather the child not be
visited by anyone than be visited by someone who is not a parent,
grandparent, or sibling; the idea is preposterous! When parents
and grandparents are unavailable, the placement of a third
party non-biological parental figure into a child’s life is
something that cannot be automatically ruled out and must be
entertained within the best interests of the child(ren). If we take
away the only connections that these children have, we are
leaving them with a slim chance to recover from their situations
and become productive adults. Additionally, their emotional and
psychological issues will go untreated and be passed down to
future generations.
Given the court’s responsibility to protect the best interest
of children,80 as well as its interest in maintaining a safe and
productive society, it is incumbent upon our judicial system to
create an environment which nurtures the relationships
between our youth and their parental figures by allowing third
parties standing to petition for visitation upon a showing of
parental unavailability. The future of our youth relies on this
judicial change in the way visitation law is applied.
Disappointingly, however, the current hardline prohibition
against standing for third-party visitation does the exact
opposite.
A.

Why the Judiciary?

During the formation of our country in the eighteenth
century, our founding fathers created a bedrock foundation
consisting of three separate branches of government, all of which
were to function independently of each other while at the same
time retain the ability to check and monitor the other

80. Determining the Best Interests of the Child, CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY (2016) (stating that courts are responsible for considering the best
interest of the child when ruling on placement and custody determinations,
safety and permanency planning, and proceedings for termination of parental
rights).
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branches.81 Ever since, the judiciary has been charged with the
responsibility to safeguard the rights that were given to
Americans under the Constitution.82 Specifically, the protection
of constitutional rights is achieved through judicial review, a
power established by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison
which consists of the ability to assess the constitutionality of
legislative and executive actions.83
As Alexander Hamilton once stated, “there is no liberty, if
the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers;”84 steadfast protection of the People’s
constitutional rights can only be accomplished through
impartial application of the law. Described as the “crown
jewel”85 of our government, judicial independence is essential to
democracy, liberty, and freedom; it is what generates fair and
impartial trials.86 Once outside forces infiltrate the judicial
system, decisions are no longer made with freedom in mind;87
the decisions become predetermined rather than resolved on the
merits.88 In order for the system of checks and balances to
properly work, the judiciary must be able to “check” the law
when situations before it present themselves as unfair.
Furthermore, history indicates that it is not uncommon for
the judiciary to provoke change in the law, especially in the
areas that contain cracks which need filling. In the 1950s, it was
the Court that provoked the desegregation of schools by making
an unparalleled decision in Brown v. Board of Education,89
which was subsequently followed by the legislature’s antidiscrimination laws. In the early 2000s, the Court contributed

81. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Preserving Our Judicial Independence, 37AUG MD. B.J. 58, 60 (2004); J. Zak Ritchie, The Separation of Powers and the
Judicial Rulemaking Power: The Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court of
Appeals Includes Legislative Privilege, 2018-SUM W. VA. L. 34 (2018).
82. Id. at 58.
83. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
84. Symposium, The Ethics of Judicial Selection, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 141,
148 (2001).
85. Id. at 14243; see also Eveleth, supra note 81, at 62.
86. Eveleth, supra note 81, at 62.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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to marriage equality through unprecedented opinions,90 and now
same-sex marriage is recognized throughout the United States. 91
Likewise, unmarried fathers have obtained certain rights
through innovative decisions from the judiciary.92 For example,
until the 1970s, when children in Illinois were born out of
wedlock to unavailable mothers, they automatically became
wards of the state without even so much as a hearing on the
unwed father’s fitness as a parent.93 It was only in 1972, due to
the Court’s landmark decision in Stanley v. Illinois, that an
unwed father’s right was finally upheld to participate in their
child’s life in a situation where the mother was unavailable.
There’s a distinct parallel that can be drawn between the
situations in Stanley and the current third-party visitation
crisis: courts have the important responsibility of protecting the
child’s best interest absent a parent’s availability.
The Court in Troxel v. Granville denied standing to third
parties because it backed a presumption that available parents
make decisions that are in the best interest of the child.94
However, a situation in which the parents are completely
unavailable is much different than that presented in Troxel
because no parent is available to make decisions, eliminating the
court’s presumption. When there aren’t any available parents,
90. See generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)
(overruling the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined a marriage, for the
purposes of the federal government, as a union between one man and one
woman); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling sodomy laws);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state constitution which
prevented homosexuals from being placed in a protected class).
91. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (declaring that the
Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage).
92. See, e.g., In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (holding
unconstitutional Domestic Relations Law § 111(1), which provided that, “while
an unwed mother's consent is always required[,] an unwed father's consent to
the adoption of his under-six-month-old child is required only where he has
openly lived with the child or the mother for six continuous months
immediately preceding the child's placement for adoption, openly
acknowledged his paternity during such period, and paid reasonable
pregnancy and birth expenses in accordance with his means”).
93. Deborah Davis Alleman, Adoption: The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REV. 923, 925 (1980).
94. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Maldonado, supra note 5, at
870.
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courts become the child’s last line of defense. They are wholly
responsible for protecting their best interests, which, when a
child does not have any parents, indisputably consists of the
maintenance of any and all third-party caregiving relationships.
Thus, visitation laws must be expanded to allow third parties a
chance to intercede and complete the job of child rearing when
parents cannot.
Courts must immediately prompt legal change in these
unjust visitation laws. Judges must eliminate the unnecessary
hardline rule against non-parental standing and instead grant
standing to third parties upon a determination that the parents
of a child are unavailable, whether it be by death, neglect, or
termination of parental rights. It is only fair to a child who has
no one else available to protect him or her. Our judicial system
is doing a complete disservice to our children by refusing to
extend visitation rights to third parties. We owe it to these
deserted children to at least consider their relationship with the
third-party caregiver and explore their next-best avenues when
parents are unavailable.
B.

Weighing the Pros and Cons

Although change should not be made without an
examination of its potential negative effects, no consequence of
third-party visitation can be worse than setting up a child for
failure. Firstly, and most importantly, courts would not be
undermining legislative intent when altering their application
of visitation law. This is because New York’s Domestic Relations
Law does not explicitly prohibit third-party visitation; rather,
this irrational application has developed over time through case
law. Therefore, courts will be able to grant standing to third
parties without defying statutory law.
One could make the argument that expanding standing for
visitation petitions would inevitably create more filed petitions
or be more expensive for courts; however, this should not deter
change because, ultimately, the best interests of the child must
be the main concern. “Procedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But
when . . . the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1

20

ARTICLE 1_PAPPALARDO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:28 PM

WE ALL NEED SOMEBODY TO LEAN ON

589

realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child. It therefore cannot stand.”95
A child absolutely should never be precluded from
obtaining visitation with their third-party caregiver just because
courts do not feel like handling more petitions. This is no excuse,
especially for an institution which was empowered and charged
with the responsibility to care for the best interests of our youth.
Additionally, this change in the law will not hurt children
because, even if standing to petition is granted to third parties,
courts will still be there to filter out harmful third-party
relationships and only grant visitation when in the best interest
of the child. The thing that is being sought is standing to
petition for visitation, or, in other words, a mere consideration,
and not an automatic denial, of children’s relationships with
non-parental caregivers. These caregivers deserve their day in
court, at a minimum for the children’s sake.
It can also be argued that allowing standing for third
parties to petition for visitation will effectively deter the same
parties from applying for custody of the same children, thus
creating a reliance on the foster care system while at the same
time enjoying the fruits of their visitation rights. Additionally,
a child may feel confused about why their aunt or uncle only
wishes to visit them and not actually take custody of them.
Albeit a practical argument, this should not prevent a child from
the benefits that come from a meaningful parent-like
relationship through visitation. Maybe the aunt and uncle do
not have the financial means to take the child in, but would like
to provide him or her with emotional support. The law simply
cannot get in their way, as the child is receiving more support
than he or she would have had there been no standing for
visitation at all. The courts have to support adults who wish to
continue healthy relationships with children without assuming
all of the encumbering parental responsibilities. It must
facilitate such an arrangement, not impede it!
A final argument could be that courts would be stepping into
ambiguous, murky territory in attempting to classify the types
of third parties that will be granted visitation and those who will
95. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 65657 (1972).
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be denied. However, this is a challenge that courts should be
able to face, as it should not be much different than a visitation
hearing for parents, grandparents, or siblings. More simply
stated, it is their obligation to face such a challenge.
In the long run, allowing third-party standing upon a
showing of parental unavailability will prove to be beneficial
because it will provide hope and love to children who are
orphaned, neglected, and abandoned – children who otherwise
would have no one to emotionally support them and would
probably otherwise seek fulfillment of their needs through other
more dangerous avenues such as prostitution and drug dealing.
Ideally, the maintenance of this support system will help the
child grow into a productive member of society.
It can also be argued that children have a fundamental,
constitutional right to the protection of their best interests.96 If
the right to conceive a child is a constitutional right, certainly
the law should provide for the protection of the children so
conceived. Additionally, if the Court has decided that the
Constitution provides parents with the fundamental right to
control the upbringing of their child, it should certainly also hold
that these children have a fundamental right to be protected.
Furthermore, not only is the current application of
visitation law a huge disregard toward the various situations
that can occur in non-traditional families, but it also statistically
provides a great disadvantage to African-American families,
which have historically embraced and relied upon community
parenting, or parenting which involves more than just two
parents, for economic and other purposes.97 There is no doubt
96. Carl Funderburk, Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an
Ambiguous Term, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229, 247 (2013).
97. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47,
57 (2007) (explaining the practice of othermothering, or when more than one
woman takes on mothering responsibilities for a child, and its economic
necessity in the African-American community); Krystal L. Sorrentino, The
Social Security Caste System and the Family Benefit: Whose Family Is it Really
Benefitting?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 137, 14445 (2011) (“Traditionally,
families of European descent tend[] to emphasize a ‘conjugal structure’
(kinship based on marriage), while families of African descent tend[] to
organize based on ‘consanguineous’ ideals (kinship that is biologically based
and centered on blood ties)”) (citing Niara SUDARKASA, INTERPRETING THE
AFRICAN HERITAGE IN AFRO-AMERICAN FAMILY ORGANIZATION, IN AMERICAN

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/1

22

ARTICLE 1_PAPPALARDO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:28 PM

WE ALL NEED SOMEBODY TO LEAN ON

591

that by ignorantly assuming that every family has one mother,
one father, and four grandparents, at least one of whom will
definitely be present to take care of the minor child(ren), courts
are showing an implicit bias toward traditional, white families,
sometimes called the “eurocentric family structure” or the
“nuclear family.”98 The judiciary should not be allowed to
interpret the Constitution to tolerate political enforcement of
white suburbia. Rather, the law should accommodate all
different types of familial backgrounds established across all
races and ethnic groups.
C.

Learning from Our Neighbors

In comparison to other states, New York is way behind
trending law, as many states throughout the country are moving
toward fostering relationships between caregivers and children
regardless of biological affiliation.99 The recent trend to consider
the best interest of the child as a paramount concern is reflected
in case law, as well as the establishment of more lenient
visitation statutes. As a historically progressive state, our
legislature should follow the inclination of other states in
working toward this noble objective.
In Youmans v. Ramos, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the visitation rights of an 11-year-old
child’s maternal aunt despite objections from the Child’s
FAMILIES 59-69 (Stephanie Coontz, Maya Parson & Gabrielle Raley eds.,
1999)); see also Herbert Fain & Kimberly Fain, Socio-Economic Status and
Legal Factors Affecting African-American Fathers, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. &
SOC. POL'Y 1, 1920 (2013) (stating how, in African households, “raising
children is more of a collective effort with strong neighborhood support-the ‘it
takes a village’ model”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. The term “eurocentric family structure” was coined by Laura Ann
Foster in 2001 when she wrote about race and gender discrimination for
African American families in social security law. Laura Ann Foster, Social
Security and African-American Families: Unmasking Race and Gender
Discrimination, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 55 (2001); see also Krystal L.
Sorrentino, The Social Security Caste System and the Family Benefit: Whose
Family Is it Really Benefitting?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 137, 14445 (2011)
(arguing that social security benefits are structured in a way which favors the
traditional, nuclear family, thus creating a discriminatory impact toward
African-American families).
99. See, infra, Section V(a).
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biological father.100 The lower court originally granted visitation
to the Aunt because the Child had lived with her for many years,
during which time she “long filled the role of the only parent for
the child.”101 Because the father was stationed in the military,
and because the Child’s twin sister was sick, the Aunt took care
of the Child from infancy. The Child continued living with the
Aunt after both her twin sister and her mother tragically passed
away. Her aunt taught her how to walk, talk, and read, made
and took her to all doctors’ appointments, took her to school and
church, and ensured that she was participating in
extracurricular activities.102 The Child called her Aunt “mom”
and her cousins, the Aunt’s children, her “brothers” and
“sisters.”103 The Aunt was the only mother that the Child ever
knew.104
When the father came back from his deployment, he sought
to enforce the custody agreement he had with his wife pursuant
to which he would receive custody of the Child should she
predecease him.105 He argued that, “in the absence of a statute
expressly permitting the order of visitation privileges to a
nonparent, the judge had no legal authority to order the
visitation.”106 However, the Court disagreed, holding that the
statute’s failure to expressly mention third parties was not a
limitation on a judge’s authority to act in accordance with a
child’s best interests.107 Despite there being no precedent
regarding de facto parenthood,108 the Court affirmed the Aunt’s
visitation rights because it was in the Child’s best interest.109 It
held that it was not a violation of the father’s right because the
Court found the Child’s welfare to be the controlling
consideration, paramount to a parent’s interest in the
relationship with their child.110 The Massachusetts Court in this
100. 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999).
101. Id. at 166.
102. Id. at 167.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 168.
106. Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Mass. 1999).
107. Id. at 170.
108. Id. at 175. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 17071.
110. Id at 17073.
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case made it clear that “[i]n every [future] case in which a court
order has the effect of disrupting a relationship between a child
and a parent, the question [is] whether it is in the child’s best
interest to maintain contact with that adult;”111 “[t]o that
governing principle, every other public and private
consideration must yield.”112
In this case, Robin McAllister, the biological mother of the
child at issue, restricted visitation with the former Stepfather,
Mark McAllister.113 Robin and Mark raised this child together
from birth to when the child was approximately seven years
old.114 Throughout this time frame, the child’s biological father
continued to pay child support and exercised parenting time up
until the child was two years old, and then again when Robin
and Mark filed for divorce. When the biological mother restricted
visitation with the stepfather, he filed for custody. The District
Court awarded the mother decision-making responsibilities and
primary residential responsibility for the child but awarded the
stepfather reasonable visitation and that none of the rights
afforded to the stepfather should affect the legal rights to the
biological father of the child. The mother appealed this decision
and the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the District
Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court stated that when dealing
with granting visitation to non-parents, “the rational of
awarding custody to grandparents is the existence of exceptional
circumstances that will further the best interest of the child” and
that “it is appropriate to extend the application of that same
rational to the award of visitation to a non-parent.” The Court
went on further to explain that due to the relationship between
the child and the stepparent, it is an exceptional circumstance
that justifies this award of visitation to further the best interests
of this child. This isn’t a case of the court taking away the rights
of any parent, but more so a court protecting the emotional needs
of a child by fostering a parent-like relationship that was formed
throughout the child’s lifetime.

111. Id. at 171 (emphasis in original).
112. Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Mass. 1999) (quoting
Richards v. Forrest, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (Mass. 1932)).
113. McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 2010).
114. Id.
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In Connecticut, there is one statute regarding visitation
with a minor child which states specifically that:
Any person may submit a verified petition to the
Superior Court for the right of visitation with any
minor child. Such petition shall include specific
and good-faith allegations that (1) a parent-like
relationship exists between the person and the
minor child, and (2) denial of visitation would
cause real and significant harm.115
Connecticut weighs different factors to determine what type of
relationship the child and adult have.116 These factors include,
but are not limited to, the length of the relationship, the parentlike activities that they partake in, the death of one of the child’s
parents, the fitness of the adult looking for visitation, and the
fitness of the custodian of the child.117 This type of statute is a
way to actually consider the relationship with the child and
determine if visitation is in the child’s best interest.
Louisiana takes a more restrictive stance in the way it
allows people to petition for visitation, but it still allows for
third-party visitation.118 Louisiana’s statute provides that
“[u]nder extraordinary circumstances, any other relative, by
blood or affinity, or a former stepparent or stepgrandparent”
may be granted visitation rights “if the court finds that it is in
the best interest of the child.”119 This is more restrictive in terms
of who can petition due to the need of a blood or affinity
relation,120 yet it is still less restrictive than New York, who
won’t even hear the petition and dismisses it as procedurally
defective.
Wisconsin has taken an even more restrictive stance, and
yet it still allows more people than New York to petition for

115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2018).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2018).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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visitation.121
Wisconsin’s visitation statute provides that
grandparents and stepparents can file for visitation.122
Comparing these statutes to New York, where there is no
statute providing visitation for anyone other than the parents,
grandparents, and siblings, we can see that most states are
moving toward allowing third party visitation as long as it is in
the best interest of the child.
When looking at different statutes that states have in
relation to third party visitation, the most compelling and
reasonable statute seems to be Delaware.123 In the State of
Delaware, a person had grounds for obtaining third-party
visitation with a child when:
(1) Third-party visitation is in the child’s best
interests; and, (2) One of the following as to each
parent: a. The parent consents to the third-party
visitation; b. The child is dependent, neglected or
abused in the parent’s care; c. The parent is
deceased; or d. The parent objects to the visitation;
however, the petitioner has demonstrated, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the objection
is unreasonable; and has demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the visitation
will not substantially interfere with the
parent/child relationship.124
As you can see by the statute, it covers all bases to ensure
that either the parent agrees or their relationship will not be
interfered with, as well as situations where the child could be
living in foster care, all while making sure that it is within the
child’s best interest.125

121. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.56 (West 2015).
122. Id.
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2412 (West 2006).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
In order to uphold the duty given to the judiciary to protect
the best interests of the children, New York courts must strongly
elicit change in the way that current visitation laws are applied
to situations where the parents are unavailable and there is an
existence of a third party parental figure in the child’s life. It is
time to look beyond unjust precedents, which have essentially
held that it is in the child’s best interest to have no one visit
them than someone who is not their parent, grandparent, or
sibling. It is time that courts begin to rule using common sense.
Every child should have a right to be fought for; courts should
give caregivers of abandoned children a chance to be heard in
court and not deny them standing based on the sole reason that
they do not fit within an arbitrary box created by poor past
legislative and judicial decisions.
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